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A COMPUTER SIMULATION OF THE UMR REACTOR
H. Allen Wilkins
Introduction
The Opportunities for Undergraduate Research project entitled, "A Computer Simulation
of the UMR Reactor" had two goals. To produce a reactor simulation to be used in creating an
artificial intelligence based reactor simulation for the UMR Nuclear Reactor and to produce a
means of teaching students the fundamentals of reactor operations.
The primary purpose was to create a program which would simulate all the situations
one would encounter in actual reactor operation. With the simulator the artificial intelligence
system could be thoroughly tested before use with actual reactor data.
This same simulator would be used as a teaching aid for students to observe events which
would not be allowed to occur with the actual reactor. The ability to get actual hands-on
experience with a real time simulation of the reactor would permit a student to obtain a better
understanding of the initial reactor physics courses by allowing the student to actually see the
subject matter put to use.
Previous Work
The starting point for the simulator was a program written by a former graduate student
which represented the physical processes which occurred within the reactor. There were
several features of this program which made it an excellent base from which to work.
First, the program was written in Pascal. The Turbo Pascal version of this language, as
published by Borland International, has a very efficient compiler which aids the programmer
in finding errors in the code. Modifications in this code would be fairly straightforward due to
the self-documenting capabilities of properly written Pascal code. This language also allowed
the actual screen display to appear more realistic due to the number of graphics routines
availab le.
Second, the graduate student solved the reactor kinetics problem using Hammings method
for the solution of stiff equations. This method, when coupled with current reactor data, allows
for up-to-date simulations of the reactor power response to a given transient condition.
Project Description
With the means of solving the reactor kinetics equations available, the main task was
now to obtain the necessary input to enable the simulator to perform as the UMR reactor would
in various situations. This would require the mating of physical equations to the reactor control
systems.
In order to accomplish this, one must first understand how the reactor operates. The
heart of the reactor is the core where fuel undergoes the fission process. The reactor is
controlled from the control room. From there the reactor operator is able to see the current state
of reactor operations with the various charts and gauges which are positioned on the control
panel. Along the top of the panel is a series of multicolored lights which display the current
status of all alarms. When the alarm is sounded, the light which corresponds to it will flash
along with the alarm. The alarms are color coded to allow the severity of the problem to be
ascertained at a glance. The alarm names on the red lights are major disturbances which
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require immediate automatic response. The alarm names on the blue lights are disturbances
which need attention because they may lead to worse events. The alarms which are on the
yellow lights are warnings which require attention but are not of extreme significance. Beneath
this alarm board there is a strip chart which gives the recent history of the reactor operation.
With this the operator can detect a trend and make a correction for it. The control room also
uses a series of switches to scale one of the strip charts to certain powers. These power scales
are 2 watts, 20 watts, 200 watts, 2000 watts, 20 kilowatts and 200 kilowatts. The operator then
judges the current power of the reactor based on a certain percentage of the given scale.
Located beneath the strip chart recorders are the reactor controls. It is with these
manual controls that the operator is able to control the reactor power by raising and lowering
control rods. As these rods are withdrawn, the number of fission reactions increases, which
causes the power to increase. Above the controls, there is a clock style gauge for each
individual rod which will display the current height of the rods. Also, there are lights used to
display whether or not the rods have been removed past a certain length, or shim range.
A reactor cannot be operated safely without a number of safety features in place. These
features are designed to automatically warn the operator of trouble and, in extreme cases, take
steps to correct the event. There are three responses which these safety features can imple
ment. They are, in order of least importance,
A)

Rod Prohibits: These relatively minor occurrences are listed on the alarm panel as the
Period Less Than 30 Seconds alarm and as the Less Than 2 Counts Per Second alarm. These
are both in the yellow section of the panel. The rod prohibits that are based on the
current rod location are always in effect during startup so they are not considered
alarming occurrences and do not set off the alarm. If they did the alarm would sound
continuously during a normal startup.

B)

Rod Rundowns: This is a more severe problem. The blue section of the alarm panel is
reserved for these problems. They are listed as the Period Less Than 15 Seconds alarm,
the 120% Full Power alarm, and the 120% demand rundown.

C)

Reactor Scrams (or rod drops): This is an extremely severe occurrence. The alarms which
have this safety response are the Period Less Than 5 Seconds alarm, the 150% Full Power
alarm and the Manual Scram alarm. These alarms are located on the red areas of the
alarm panel.

The alarm panel works in conjunction with these safety systems to allow the operator to
understand what has happened and why.
This suggests that the simulator must include several procedures to make it perform all
the safety checks and actions. The safety systems, or interlocks, which needed to be written
included:
*1

Shim Range Regulating Rod Lock. This prevents the regulating rod from being raised
unless all three control rods are raised above the shim range (approximately 12.5 inches).

*2

Control Rod Lock Due to Extended Regulating Rod. This prevents the control rods from
being raised if the regulating rod is not fully inserted and at least one control rod is below
shim range. This could occur if all three control rods were above shim range, allowing the
regulating rod to move, and then one control rod were to be lowered below shim range.
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*3

Manual Scram. This is a button which will force all the control rods to drop at once.

*4

150% Full Power Scram. This will cause the rods to drop if the reactor reaches 150% of its
full power which is 300 kilowatts.

*5

Period Less Than 5 Seconds Scram. This scram will automatically occur if the time it
takes for the reactor power to increase by a factor of 'e', is less than 5 seconds.
N O TE: All scram s prevent any further use of the reactor unless the scram reset button is depressed.

*6

120% Demand Rundown. This causes the control rods to automatically perform a
controlled descent into the reactor if the power exceeds 120% of what the current power
scale is.

*7

120% Full Power Rundown. This causes the control rods to rundown into the reactor if the
power ever exceeds 120% of full reactor power which amounts to 240 kilowatts.

*8

Period Less than 15 Seconds Rundown. This rundown will occur if the time it takes for the
reactor power to change by a factor of ,e, is less than 15 seconds.
NOTE: All rundowns require that the rundown reset button be pressed before the rods can be extended again.

*9

Less Than Two Counts Per Second Rod Interrupt. This feature prevents the control rods
from being withdrawn any farther unless the situation is corrected. The user is prevented
from using the reactor without a neutron source thanks to this system.

*10

Period Less Than 30 Seconds Rod Interrupt This prevents the control rods from being
raised any further unless the period returns to a value greater than 30 seconds.

Another set of features which had to be installed were the Board Acknowledge and the
Board Reset buttons. The Board Acknowledge button allows the alarm to be acknowledged,
which silences the alarm yet leaves a light corresponding to that alarm lit above the control
console. The Board Reset button clears all alarm lights and allows the alarms which were
previously acknowledged to sound.
The first level safety interlocks, or rod prohibits, can be bypassed. This is done when the
senior reactor operator wishes to operate the reactor under conditions which would set off a
specific, low danger, safety alarm. When the safety system is bypassed, the alarm will still
sound but the control rods will not be prohibited from moving further. This allows the
regulating rod to be tested without the regular control rods withdrawn. It also allows for faster
power changes and low source tests. Implementing the bypass procedure would be very similar
to a reactor safety system failure procedure.
In order to determine how these safety features worked together, the senior reactor
operators needed to be asked questions concerning the types of systems present in the reactor
system. Questions concerning the order of alarm precedence were asked most frequently. This
allowed the simulator to model the portions of the standard operating procedures which were
based on hardware requirements.
A number of other questions dealt with how the reactor would respond if the various
safety interlocks were to fail. To simulate this on the program a procedure to deactivate a
given safety interlock needed to written. This procedure would turn a particular safety system
off when a particular sequence of keys was pressed.
-
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The safety interlocks, alarms, and acknowledgements outlined above were all incorpo
rated into the simulator with the exception of the Rod Prohibit Bypasses.
Rrecommendations for Future Work
The next step which needs to be implemented is a fission chamber. While the simulator
works from an operational standpoint, in order for a true startup to be accomplished, the
operator must have data which can only be made available from a log count meter and a linear
power scale. This will require a series of measurements to be taken of the reactor fission
chamber. These measurements must be taken over a short period of time since the exact counts
from the fission chamber vary over the lifetime of the unit. Another area to look at would be
the variance of the log power meter to take into account over or under compensation of the
compensated ion chamber. A procedure to take the failure of magnetic current in the control rods
could also be worked out. This would be similar to the current procedure for inducing a scram,
only the reactivity would change by a smaller amount. From an operational standpoint, one
could include a bridge radiation term in the readouts. This would make the inclusion of a
nitrogen diffuser something worthwhile, instead of a set of lights and switches with no real
purpose. The alarm board lights could also be made to fail in order to observe what the loss of
one of one of the readout systems did to the ability of a student to diagnose what is happening
inside.
In the future this program will be used in the evaluation of student performance under the
stress of postulated accident scenarios. If some system fails while the reactor is being brought to
a higher power, how will that student react? It will be necessary for these students to
understand some sort of standard response to these situations. This is necessary since the real
UMR reactor will never allow someone to do some of the things which can occur in the
simulator.
Conclusions
In conclusion, this OURE project allowed me to gain insight into the workings of the UMR
reactor safety system while also producing a program which is capable of being used in many
projects. These projects can be as diverse as a room full of computers where an instructor gives
students the basics of reactor operations, to a high powered computer which constantly presents
solutions to current reactor problems after a set of simulation responses has been evaluated.
This project will certainly aid the students as well as provide growth potential for future
research efforts.

-

420 -

